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Abstract
Recent commentaries by Verheijde et al, Evans and Potts suggesting that donation after cardiac
death practices routinely violate the dead donor rule are based on flawed presumptions. Cell
biology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, critical care life support technologies, donation and
transplantation continue to inform concepts of life and death. The impact of oxygen deprivation to
cells, organs and the brain is discussed in relation to death as a biological transition. In the face of
advancing organ support and replacement technologies, the reversibility of cardiac arrest is now
purely related to the context in which it occurs, in association to the availability and application of
support systems to maintain oxygenated circulation. The 'complete and irreversible' lexicon
commonly used in death discussions and legal statutes are ambiguous, indefinable and should be
replaced by accurate terms. Criticism of controlled DCD on the basis of violating the dead donor
rule, where autoresuscitation has not been described beyond 2 minutes, in which life support is
withdrawn and CPR is not provided, is not valid. However, any post mortem intervention that re-
establishes brain blood flow should be prohibited. In comparison to traditional practice, organ
donation has forced the clarification of the diagnostic criteria for death and improved the rigour of
the determinations.
Commentary
Our ability to support organ failure with technology and
transplantation raises important questions of when a dis-
ease is irreversible, when further treatment is no longer
effective and when death has occurred. Continuing scien-
tific advance forces our communities to reflect on the con-
cept and definition of death, and we continue to
thoughtfully struggle in this regard. The practice of organ
donation galvanizes these issues. In particular, the imme-
diacy of procurement in donation after cardiac death
(DCD) has incited scrutiny and ominous concerns.
Observations and criticisms of existing and evolving prac-
tices are indispensable, in order guard against erosions of
ethical practice. This journal has contributed to the debate
with recent provocative commentaries by Verheijde et al
[1] followed by supportive responses by Evans [2] and
Potts [3]. All three commentaries hinge much of their crit-
icism around the dead donor rule, and the contention that
current DCD practices violate this rule. This is the focus of
the ensuing discussion.
Verheijde et al contend that this rule should be aban-
doned but transformed to allow the removal of organs
from dying rather than dead persons. Evans contends that
because complex organs taken from unequivocally dead
people are not suitable for transplantation, human death
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stage in the dying process. Potts categorically contends
that DCD should be banned from practice. Central to this
discussion is the distinction of whether the DCD candi-
date is recently and legitimately dead, as opposed to dying
but nearly and not quite dead. The authors make allega-
tions of transgressions of ethical and moral practice by the
transplant communities.
Inherent to these contentions is the flawed presumption
that there is and was a clear line between alive and dead
and this was fully understood before and subsequent to
organ donation practices. This line of 'unequivocal death',
as implied by all 3 papers, was clearly delineated and is
now clearly being violated. This erroneous presumption
fuels much debate and misunderstanding about the com-
plex biology of life and death. Death and our understand-
ing of it as a biological event, with profound social,
religious and psychological customs, is relative to the con-
text of experience and the accumulation of scientific infor-
mation available. This biological understanding has
evolved and deepened as a direct result of technology, cell
biology, organ donation and transplantation, but has
been inadequately reconciled in law, health policy and
bioethical discourse. Organ donation, as one of the
immediate sequels to death, has forced the understand-
ing, acceptance or persisting controversy of where that
line is. For an instructive review, I refer readers to a superb
historical, social and biological examination of death in a
book entitled "The Way We Die" by Ivan and Melrose[4].
Historically, there has been little need for diagnostic or
conceptual precision in regard to death. Early humans
associated living with breathing and cessation of life was
marked by unresponsiveness and the absence of respira-
tion. The discovery of blood circulation by William Har-
vey in 1628 and the stethoscope in 1816 allowed the
absence of heartbeat to be included in the determination.
In recent decades and disturbingly so, the professional
determination of death after cardiac arrest has remained
rudimentary and of low rigour. Death occurred upon a
doctor or coroner's determination. The criteria used were
not articulated and remained untaught in training, rang-
ing from absence of movement, breathing, heart sounds,
pulse or EKG activity, applied at discretion of the attend-
ing physician. Observation and confirmation was not
required and the irreversibility of death was not a practical
concern, although diagnostic errors were made. Organ
donation in general, and DCD in particular, has by neces-
sity enhanced the rigour of the determination of death.
Life is fundamentally based on the maintenance of indi-
vidual and collective cell function, dependent of the pro-
vision of nutrients and oxygen. Cell biology has
demonstrated that a layer of human cells, separated from
the human organism, may be grown in laboratory culture
as long as they are bathed in a sterile supply of nutrients
and oxygen. The human being, a complex arrangement of
trillions of cells organized into organ systems, requires a
cardiopulmonary delivery system (lung, heart and circula-
tory system) for oxygen and nutrients to reach the cells.
The development and evolution of modern cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation evolving into cardiopulmonary support
technologies have been important advances informing
our concepts of life and death.
The most common mechanism of cell injury that leads to
cell death is oxygen deprivation as seen with the arrest of
blood flow. Oxygen deprivation causes the inability to
produce energy and depletes energy stores required to
maintain cell function. Within limits and differing accord-
ing to which cell type is housed within which organ, the
cell can compensate for energy loss and can return to nor-
mal function if the delivery of oxygen resumes. Permanent
loss of oxygen delivery will cause cells to pass the thresh-
old to irreversible injury and cell death, morphologically
characterized by necrosis.
It is important to emphasize that the time to death for
each cell, and each organ, will vastly differ. This has been
well demonstrated by cell biologists who can remove and
grow human cells in laboratory culture hours or days after
death has occurred. Skins cells can be grown in culture
when removed over 24 hours post-mortem [5], and brain
cells can be grown if removed within 8 hours and can sur-
vive up to 78 days [6]. Transplant specialists, who are
effectively organ biologists, have taught us that organ
function is recoverable and transplantable for many hours
post mortem, depending on duration of time after the
arrest of circulation, temperature and the use of preserva-
tion solutions. Both in life and after death, different
organs tolerate oxygen deprivation differently. The kidney
is more resilient and resistant that other organs such as the
liver. Within the brain, the cortex and cerebrum is less tol-
erant than the brainstem, resulting in conditions such as
persistent vegetative states after resuscitated cardiac arrest.
Even up to 7 days post-mortem, the human cornea can
provide viable cells to enable transplantation [7]. From a
purist perspective, the complete and irreversible cessation
of all cell life has become increasingly indefinable.
Advances in organ support and replacement technologies
teach us about the mechanics of death. Survival of the
individual organs and the human organism is related to
adequacy of oxygenated blood flow and this is the princi-
ple goal of cardiopulmonary resuscitation and critical care
support. There are 3 basic mechanisms [8]: a) primary car-
diac arrest leading to arrest of the circulation b) primary
respiratory arrest, which via loss of oxygen causes a sec-
ondary cardiac arrest, or c) primary brain arrest, which viaPage 2 of 5
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piratory then cardiac arrest. Regardless of initial disease
state, all critical illnesses threaten life in this way. Inter-
ruption of this sequence and providing oxygen delivery
with various forms of support is fundamental to critical
care practice. Life sustaining technologies are deployed,
with the use of artificial airways, mechanical ventilators,
heart and circulatory support and kidney replacement
therapies. Advanced support may include systems external
to the body such as extracorporeal membrane oxygena-
tion (ECMO) and artificial hearts (ventricular assist
devices). The principle behind their application is to sus-
tain vital function, to allow time or treatment to reverse
the underlying life threatening state. When the underlying
disease state cannot be remedied, the removal of those
applied life sustaining technologies must occur for 'natu-
ral' death and cardiac arrest to ensue. Withdrawal and
withholding of life sustaining technologies is the most
common event preceding death in ICU practice world-
wide.
The reversibility of cardiac arrest is now purely related to
the context in which it occurs. The ability to restore the cir-
culation depends on the location of the arrest, a predeter-
mined ethical decision regarding level of medical
intervention, the types of interventions available (cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation, extracorporeal membrane oxy-
genation, or ventricular assist devices), and the types of
interventions actually used. Medicine has advanced to the
point where all vital organs (heart, lung, liver, kidney) can
be supported by machines, or replaced by transplantation.
Complete and irreversible arrest of the heart is not death,
as long as oxygenated circulation to the body can be pro-
vided mechanically. Circulation can be artificially main-
tained for days, weeks and months and the arrested heart
can then be replaced by transplantation. The event may be
the cardiac arrest, but death is only occurs if it leads to an
accompanying loss of circulation.
The brain is the only organ that cannot be supported or
replaced by technology. For all forms of severe brain
injury, ICU care does not replace any functions of the
brain. Breathing replacement machines merely interrupt
the way brain failure leads to cardiac arrest. Contrary to
previous perceptions that brain death invariably leads to
cardiac arrest [9], any degree of brain failure, including
brain death, can be sustained indefinitely with mechani-
cal ventilation and vigilant care. While the brain may be
irreversibly arrested, the body can be maintained, as dem-
onstrated in case series of brain death in pregnancy with
fetuses brought to term [10].
It is the arrest of brain blood flow that occurs after cardiac
arrest that is of vital importance. The success of resuscita-
tion is judged by the ability to reanimate the brain once
spontaneous or mechanical circulation has been reestab-
lished. The limits of brain resuscitation are commonly
quoted as 4–10 minutes [4] and Verheijde et al [1] state
the following, without reference or elaboration: 'longer
than 10 minutes of absent circulation is required for irre-
versible cessation of the entire human brain, including
brain stem function'. In reality, the duration of circulatory
arrest that precludes recovery of any residual amount of
brain function is unknown but is lengthening. Although
arrest time is paramount, the conditions of the cardiac
arrest (temperature) and the manner in which the circula-
tion is re-established, (eg. hypertensive reperfusion, hypo-
thermia, neuroprotective agents) will extend the time for
potential recovery of various degrees of brain function
well beyond 10 minutes [11]. This is supported by clinical
studies of improvements in neurological function with
the use of cooling in human cardiac arrest victims [12].
The aforementioned ability to grow human brain cells 8
hours after death suggests that at the cellular level, 'irre-
versible cessation of the entire brain' is elusive.
Brain death is better understood as brain arrest, character-
ized by the complete and irreversible loss of clinical brain
function. The most reliable ancillary test for brain death is
the absence of brain blood flow [13,14], related to pure
oxygen deprivation. For the purposes of DCD, the cardiac
arrest leads to absent brain blood flow. Although brain
death examinations are not performed after circulatory
arrest, the permanent absence of brain blood flow invari-
ably leads to brain death in a short time frame and is con-
ceptually and physiologically consistent with brain death
[15]. In humans [16,17] and animal studies [18], it takes
less than 20 seconds for cortical brain function to stop
after cardiac arrest. This can be reversed if the brain blood
flow is quickly re-established. It is not clear how long
brain blood flow must be arrested to uniformly preclude
reanimation of neurological function. However, any per-
manent absence of brain blood flow beyond 20 seconds
will lead to permanent absence of brain function. Funda-
mentally, and most relevant to DCD, the issue is not
whether the body or brain circulation and function can be
resumed (because it can), but rather, whether it will be.
The Institute of Medicine [19] and the ethics committee of
the American College of Critical Care Medicine [20] have
addressed the ambiguity surrounding the term "irreversi-
ble" similarly.
Accepting the concept that the permanent absence of
brain blood flow is death, I share Verheijde et al concerns
about the reported practices of CPR or extracorporeal oxy-
genated circulation applied after death, expressly for the
purposes of organ preservation in DCD [22,22]. This is a
true violation of the dead donor rule, as death cannot be
ensured if brain blood flow recommences. For this reason,
Canadian DCD guidelines explicitly prohibit any postPage 3 of 5
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[23].
A major criticism of DCD protocols has been the concern
regarding the time of observation to determine death and
the possibility that death is not 'irreversible' within the
time limits proposed. There have been case reports of
spontaneous resumption of heart function after cardiac
arrest (autoresuscitation), ranging from seconds to min-
utes and longer. The true incidence and conditions that
increase the potential for such an event are unclear and
many reports are hampered by inadequate monitoring
[24,25]. Some cases are related to mistaken diagnosis [26-
28]. There is a clear distinction between those cases who
have received CPR, where the reports of autoresuscitation
range from seconds to 20 minutes [29]. No autoresuscita-
tion after withdrawal of life sustaining treatment has been
described beyond 2 minutes in the absence of CPR [30]
suggesting that the provision of CPR is a confounding
condition. This may occur because a buildup of pressure
in the chest as a cause of absent circulation even as the
heart is beating [24,31]. The incidence of autoresuscita-
tion after even a minute, although cited as a common con-
cern and criticism, is extremely rare and is likely
negligible. Regardless, there have been no prospective
studies to substantiate or negate these concerns. The true
incidence, risk factors, temporal characteristics and out-
comes after autoresuscitation are unknown. It has been
estimated that a study of over 10,000 patients would be
required to have sufficient power to exclude the possibil-
ity of autoresuscitation after more than 2 minutes. At min-
imum, the current discussion and criticisms of DCD as
manifest in the preceding commentaries [1-3] should dis-
tinguish between controlled and uncontrolled DCD. The
vast majority of DCD worldwide is controlled, in situa-
tions where life support is withdrawn and CPR is not pro-
vided. Criticism of controlled DCD on the basis of
violating the dead donor rule, where autoresuscitation has
not been described beyond 2 minutes, is not valid.
From a cellular, organ and whole body human-based per-
spectives, the commonly used terms in the lexicon of
death, such as 'complete and irreversible' cessation
[32,33] of function or life processes are not definable. The
so-called time of death has always been an arbitrary
moment within an overlapping segment of decreasing
vital functions and increasing quantity of cell death [4].
No matter how convenient it is to assume that death and
life are opposite and that a patient is either dead or alive,
the process of death is a gradual event where organs and
cells die at different rates depending on their resistance to
the lack of oxygen [4]. As a result, the biology of death
cannot be a moment, as the law may imply and people
wish to believe. It is and always has been a line within an
overlapping segment of decreasing cell functions and
increasing cell death, based on the existing methods for its
determination and now further complicated by available
methods of circulatory support.
In medical practice and law, the separation between being
alive and dead should not be ambiguous. It marks the
point in time after which consequences occur, including
no legal or medical requirement to provide resuscitation
or life support technologies, loss of personhood and most
individual rights, the opportunity for organ donation and
autopsy proceedings, execution of the decedent's legal
will, estate and property transfer, payment of life insur-
ance, final disposition of the body by burial or cremation,
and religious or social ceremonies to mark the end of a
life. Organ donation has not created this reality, but con-
tinues to force its reconciliation.
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